Introduction
The following material develops the mathematical basis for the application of SDT and Bayesian methods to the certification of optional aircraft systems. The discussion begins with a review of SDT principles, which are then mapped to their counterparts in the certification domain. The concepts of cost and efficiency are then applied to optimize the risk/benefit ratio for the system under investigation. The discussion concludes with a case study of the method's application to an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) software application.
Signal Detection Theory Basics
Signal Detection Theory was initially formulated by Peterson, Birdsall, and Fox (1954) and extended by Tanner and Swets (1954) and Green and Swets (1966) . Abdi (2009) extended SDT beyond the literal interpretation of physical parameters into the domains of abstract or metaphorical signals, which is pertinent to the current context. An early applications of Signal Detection Theory was to model human operator performance during target detection tasks on early radar displays. These devices suffered high levels of noise in relation to the relatively weak signal strength of the target, making the detection task difficult and probabilistic. In such situations, the radar operator and the radar each can have two states, resulting in four possible SDT system combinations:
1. A target is present on the display (a Signal), and it is detected by the operatora Hit 2. A target is present, and is not detecteda Miss 3. No target is present, but one is detected (i.e. noise is mistaken for the target)a False Alarm (FA) 4. No target is present, and none is detecteda Correct Rejection (CR) In the following discussion, the meanings of Hit, Miss, FA, and CR are to be interpreted in the SDT context. The Hit and CR states represent the ideal operation of the system, and they may have associate benefits. Conversely, misses and FAs are undesirable, and each has an associated cost. For example, the result of a Miss could be the destruction of one's vessel by a hostile party. Equally, an FA could result in the destruction of an innocent (non-target) party by our weapon system.
The final variable is the Decision Criterion adopted by the operator, which defines the operator's Response Bias. The response bias of a risky operator results in more detected signals, leading to greater numbers of hits and accompanying FAs. Conversely, a conservative operator would incur more Misses but fewer FAs. A hypothetical unbiased ideal operator sets the decision criterion in an optimum manner to minimize undesirable Misses and FAs. Any deviation from the ideal threshold represents a conservative or liberal bias.
The Response Bias adopted by the operator is also affected by the likelihood of a signal being observed, as well as by the costs and benefits of acting on a perceived signal. For example, if the likelihood of a signal and the cost of a Miss are both high (e.g. an incoming missile is both likely and catastrophic), then the operator would be very likely to perceive every stimulus as a target. On the other hand, if the cost of an FA were high (e.g. downing a civilian airliner), and the target probability extremely low (e.g. in peacetime), the operator would be unlikely to respond unless the target signal was overpowering.
The importance of SDT is that it allows an exact calculation of the optimum Response Bias, given known likelihoods of observing a signal, and with defined costs and benefits (Wickens, 1992, p. 29) . This is a striking conclusion that forms the link between SDT and the aeronautical certification domain, with its highly probabilistic foundations.
SDT Definitions
At any given moment, time t, the signal can have one of two states: Condition C0the signal is absent; Condition C1a signal is present. The system produces output data, x(t), corresponding to the signal state. The operator will act on this data to make one of the following decisions or judgments:
Decision D0the signal is absent; Decision D1a signal is present. Accordingly, SDT yields four possible system states, defined as follows:
D1C1 -Hit; D0C1 -Miss; D1C0 -False Alarm; and D0C0 -Correct Rejection. Let: P(C0) be the a-priori probability of event C0 and P(C1) be the a-priori probability of event C1, then: Events C1 and C0 are complementary, so P(C0) = 1 -P(C1). In practice, the absolute probabilities P(D1C1), P(D0C1), P(D1C0), and P(D0C0) are usually unknown, so conditional probabilities are substituted for the four system states identified above: PH = P(D1|C1) is the Hit probability, which is the conditional probability of D1, given that C1 has occurred. Similarly: PM = P(D0|C1) is the Miss probability. PM = 1 -PH, because these are the only two possible outcomes, given the presence of a signal.
Also: PFA = P(D1|C0) is the FA probability; PCR = P(D0|C0) is the CR probability. Again, PCR = 1 -PFA, because these are the only two possible outcomes, given the absence of a signal.
SDT Costs
In SDT, there are two possible failure outcomes: Miss and False Alarm. These generally have different negative consequences, depending on the real-world situation. For this reason, SDT introduces two corresponding relational error costs: c01 -Miss Cost; c10 -FA Cost.
SDT Average Risk
Combining these concepts, SDT characterizes the average risk value of the system as:
R = c01PMP(C1) + c10PFAP(C0)
(1) If all the values in (1) are known, the Bayes Criterion of Minimum Average Risk R (R → min) yields an Optimal Detection Criterion that will maximize the system's Hits and minimize the False Alarms (Van Trees, 2001) . Note that the optimum performance of the system does not eliminate Misses and FAs, because of the probabilistic nature of the system, but the Bayes Criterion does provide the optimum theoretical system performance. The only drawback of the Bayes approach is that the variables in (1) are not usually known. Nevertheless, the equation can be used as a starting point for the application of SDT for certification purposes. Before making this transition, it is necessary to examine the probabilistic underpinnings of current certification approaches.
Failure Conditions, Failures and Errors
Aeronautical Circular 23.1309-E (FAA, 2011) defines the following terms:
Error
An omission or incorrect action by a crewmember or maintenance personnel, or a mistake in requirements, design, or implementation.
Failure
An occurrence that affects the operation of a component, part, or element such that it can no longer function as intended (this includes both loss of function and malfunction). Note: Errors may cause failures but are not considered failures.
Failure Condition
A condition having an effect on either the airplane or its occupants, or both, either direct or consequential, which is caused or contributed to by one or more failures or errors considering flight phase and relevant adverse operational or environmental conditions or external events. Figure  2 of 23.1309-E (FAA, 2011, p. 23) places maximum bounds for different Failure Condition severity levels as follows: The probability of a failure condition occurring on an "average flight" should be determined by structured methods (see ARP 4761 for various methods) and should consider all elements (e.g., combinations of failures and events) that contribute to a failure condition. If there is only an effect when failures occur in a certain order, the calculation should account for the conditional probability that the failures occur in the sequence necessary to produce a failure condition (FAA, 2011, p. A3-1).
In particular, if a Failure Condition may be caused by 1 of n mutually exclusive failures F1, …, Fn, then: P(FC) = P(FC|F1)P(F1) + … + P(FC|Fn)P(Fn)
This is the certification equivalent of SDT equation (1) above. In the context of an information system, (2) does not differentiate between the different costs associated with Loss-of-Function failures (Misses) from Hazardously Misleading ones (False Alarms). Equation (3) also takes no account of the potential benefits of the optional system, as there are no benefits terms in the equation. Accordingly, an optional safety system, of the type being addressed by this paper, might be deemed uncertifiable, despite overwhelming potential benefits. This shortcoming can be addressed by mapping the SDT approach to the certification domain.
Mapping SDT and Aircraft Certification Terms
The SDT concepts of Signals, Hits, Misses, FAs, CRs, and System Average Risk can be applied to optional aircraft safety systems, whereby a Signal is viewed as a pilot error, and a Hit is viewed as a Save by the safety system in question. Using this approach, the SDT definitions can be mapped to the certification environment as follows:
Signal represents an unaided pilot error when the safety system is not installed that can cause an accident (i.e. UPE -an unaided pilot error). An optional safety system is therefore analogous to a Signal Detection System in SDT. The associated Signal probability is denoted by PUPE.
Hit denotes a "save" by a correctly functioning safety system, which prevents the pilot from making an error that would otherwise have been committed. An SDT Hit maps to a certification Save, with a probability of PSave.
Miss denotes a safety system's failure to prevent an error under UPE conditions. Let's denote Miss by NSave (No Save) and the Miss probability by PNSave.
Correct Rejection reflects the correct operation of the system in the absence of any pilot error.
False Alarm represents a safety system failure that results in Hazardously Misleading (HM) data being presented, in the absence of a UPE. The equivalent False Alarm probability is PHM.
Miss Cost denotes the conditional probability of a Failure Condition of a specified severity level arising as a result of a safety system's failure to Save P(FC|NSave). This parameter broadly characterizes the severity of the consequences of the safety system's failure.
False Alarm Cost denotes the conditional probability of a Failure Condition of a specified severity level arising as a result of a safety system's issuing a False Alarm (or Hazardously Misleading Information) P(FC|HM). This parameter captures the severity of the consequences of the safety system's issuing a false alarm.
Applying these mappings of SDT terms, the Average System Risk from (1) can be rewritten as: R = P(FC|NSave)PNSavePUPE + P(FC|HM)PHM(1 -PUPE) (4) Any possible failure in SDT can be categorized either as a Miss (NSave) or a False Alarm (HM), which are mutually exclusive, so, according to (3), the R in (4) is analogous to P(FCi) in the Certification Requirement (2) above.
The System Efficiency Concept
In (4) above, R is the risk of a Failure Condition when the system is present. We now define Rw as the risk of the same Failure Condition without the optional system. It follows that the system is effective if the overall risk with the system is lower than the risk without the system installed:
R < Rw (5) This is the key formula for determining any safety system efficiency. The percentage efficiency of a safety system can be considered as:
Eff(%)= 100(Rw -R)/Rw (6) Let Pw(FC|UPE) be the conditional probability of specified Failure Condition without the system, under a given UPE condition. The overall risk of the specified Failure Conditions is therefore: Rw = Pw(FC|UPE)PUPE (7) Using (4) and (7), we can rewrite the efficiency requirement (5) as:
P(FC|NSave)PNSavePUPE + P(FC|HM)PHM(1 -PUPE) < Pw(FC|UPE)PUPE
(8) NSave represents a failure event under a given UPE condition. This is no different than the situation where a pilot has made an error without the system installed, so P(FC|NSave) = Pw(FC|UPE), and (8) 
P(FC|HM)PHM(1-PUPE) < Pw(FC|UPE)PUPEPSave
(9) This formula quantitatively defines the threshold criterion at which the optional safety system statistically breaks even with the baseline unmodified aircraft, taking into account both the risks and the potential benefits of the system. The application of the preceding criterion is best illustrated using a case study.
Case Study
The following example pertains to the presentation of an aircraft position spotter during flight on an EFB-hosted electronic chart, which is currently prohibited unless an "…installed primary flight display, weather display, or map display also depict(s) own-ship position" (FAA, 2017, p. 15) .
The use of a spotter undoubtedly confers some operational and safety benefits, but at the risk of misleading the crew if a software failure leads to a hazardously misleading (HM) condition. This could arise if the spotter is shown in the wrong position or orientation. The situation would result in a failure condition if the pilot(s) follow the bad data, Air Traffic Control doesn't catch the error, etc. These probabilities can be estimated and applied to (9) to quantitatively determine if the spotter confers a positive safety benefit. To do so, we introduce the following events for illustrative purposes only:
ErrSw -an untrapped software error has caused a hazardously misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE); ErrGPS -incorrect GPS or navigation input to the spotter has caused a hazardously misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE);
ErrDB -a chart database error has caused a hazardously misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE);
Nr -"Not recognized": the crew fail to recognize the HM that the aircraft is not at the displayed position; E1 -the HM information is in a dangerous sense (e.g. the error biases the crew towards an occupied runway, rather than away from it); E2 -the crew follows the HM information, despite other visual or navigation cues;
E3 -Air Traffic Control fails to detect the hazardous maneuver; and E4 -the crew action actually causes an accident (e.g. collision with terrain, obstacles, or another aircraft).
Using the definitions above, the combined probability of Hazardously Misleading Information from the three identified causes is: PHM = 1 -(1-PErrSw)(1-PErrGPS)(1-PErrDB) (10) Nr, E1, E2, E3, and E4 are the necessary events following HM that will lead to a Failure Condition, so: P(FC|HM) = P(E4E3E2E1|NrHM)P(Nr|HM) (11) Once the crew has failed to recognize a hazardously misleading spotter event, the probability of the subsequent events (E1-E4) leading to a Failure Condition are identical, whether the system is present or not. For example: ATC is no more or less likely to detect a deviation caused by an HM-induced spotter-error than one caused by an unaided pilot error without the system installed. Similarly, the likelihood of a random unaided pilot error (UPE) being in a dangerous sense is identical to the probability that a random HM software error is also in a dangerous sense. For example: random software and pilot errors would be expected to have equal probabilities of biasing the crew towards, or away from, an occupied runway. Summarizing this concept: P(E4E3E2E1|NrHM) = Pw(FC|UPE) (12) Using (11) and (12), the system efficiency criterion (9) can be rewritten as:
Pw ( For the electronic chart spotter, formulas (10) and (13) can be combined to calculate the maximum acceptable probability of an untrapped software error leading to an HM event:
1-(1-PErrSw)(1-PErrGPS)(1-PErrDB) < PSavePUPE/(P(Nr|HM)(1-PUPE))
(14) Formula (14) yields a quantified measure of the required system reliability. The final step in the analysis is to examine the variation of the maximum allowable probability of a Hazardously Misleading software error PErrSw. This is best visualized graphically, and requires the introduction of three final constructs.
PSave and P(Nr|HM) in (14) are difficult to calculate with absolute accuracy, but a solution can be derived by revisiting the automobile airbag example used in the introduction. It is doubtful that accurate figures could be derived for airbag "saves" and for "losses" caused by malfunctioning airbags. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude of the save ratio can be estimated. The same analogy applies to the un-quantified probabilities above: the order of magnitude of the ratio PSave/P(Nr|HM) can be estimated, with sufficient accuracy for this analysis. This ratio is used as abscissa for the required system reliability plot.
Similarly, the effect of a wide range of PUPE values should be examined in order to determine the system sensitivity to the probability of Unaided Pilot Errors. For this reason, (14) is used to produce a family of curves for varying PUPE values. These have been bounded within a range of range 10 -2 -10 -4 because the former would represent many thousands of errors every day, when viewed across all flight operations worldwide. Conversely, the latter would imply that a representative 20,000-hour pilot has only made one such error in his or her career, based on an average stage-length of two hours.
The last assumption relates to the values for PErrGPS and PErrDB. These are effectively the probabilities of a hazardously misleading GPS position (independent of the EFB and its software), and of a hazardous chart database error. These probabilities can be derived in a number of ways, including service history and FOQA data reviews, but for the purpose of the case study, they are arbitrarily assigned the following values: PErrGPS = 10 -6 PErrDB = 10 -5 Figure 1 illustrates the result of applying the preceding assumptions to (14) . The y-axis (max. acceptable PErrSw) has a logarithmic scale with the inverse order of values. The following example illustrate the practical application of Figure  1 . Assuming that the pilot's probability of making an unaided error is 10 -3 , and that the system saves 25 times as often as it hazardously misleads, then the required system reliability to achieve a net beneficial effect is approximately 2.5 x 10 -2 . This corresponds to DO-178C Level D software (RTCA, 2012), which is achievable by Commercial-Off-The Shelf (COTS) products and applications. If this performance requirement is exceeded, the optional system would yield a positive safety improvement over the baseline, even though the assumed reliability is several orders of magnitude below that required for navigation systems. Figure 1 also shows that the software reliability must be increased (i.e. the failure rate must decrease), when either of the following occurs: 1. The pilot becomes more reliable; and/or 2. The system Save/Unrecognized Hazard ratio decreases.
Conclusions
Signal Detection Theory and Bayesian optimization methods can be applied to the certification of optional aircraft systems, and a formal method has been developed that allows the numerical optimization of the risk/benefit ratio of such systems. Using representative data from the case study of a spotter on an electronic chart, it has been demonstrated that safety benefits would be achieved, even with the software reliability levels typically associated with COTS software such as Windows™ which are significantly below the current certification standards. The method makes few domain assumptions, and is based on the underpinnings of SDT and Bayesian probability theory, with well-established validity and reliability. Accordingly, the technique should have broad application to the certification of all optional aircraft systems.
Nomenclature
ATC -Air Traffic Control CR -Correct Rejection E1 -the HM information is in a dangerous sense (e.g. the error biases the crew towards an occupied runway, rather than away from it) E2 -the crew follows the HM information, despite other visual or navigation cues E3 -Air Traffic Control fails to detect the hazardous maneuver E4 -the crew action actually causes an accident (e.g. collision with terrain, obstacles, or another aircraft) ErrDB -a chart database error has caused a hazardously misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE) ErrGPS -incorrect GPS or navigation input to the spotter has caused a hazardously misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE) ErrSw -an untrapped software error has caused a hazardously misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE) FA -False Alarm FAA -Federal Aviation Administration FC -Failure Condition FOQA -Flight Operations Quality Assurance HM -Hazardously Misleading Nr -"Not recognized": the crew fail to recognize the HM that the aircraft is not at the displayed position NSave -No Save P -Probability R -Risk of a failure condition when the system is present Rw -Risk of the same failure condition Without the system RTCA -Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics SAE -Society of Automotive Engineers UPE -Unaided Pilot Error
